Nationalism in the twenty-first century : challenges and responses. by Sutherland,  Claire
Durham Research Online
Deposited in DRO:
15 March 2013
Version of attached ﬁle:
Accepted Version
Peer-review status of attached ﬁle:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Sutherland, Claire (2011) 'Nationalism in the twenty-ﬁrst century : challenges and responses.', Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan.
Further information on publisher's website:
http://www.palgrave.com/products/title.aspx?pid=316147
Publisher's copyright statement:
Sample chapter deposited. Chapter 1: 'Why the nation? theories of nationalism'.
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 | Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
 23 
Chapter 1: Why the nation? Theories of nationalism 
 
Can any one theory explain nationalism? What are the differences between 
today’s nationalisms and nineteenth and twentieth century nationalisms? 
 
Definitions of the nation are necessarily linked to different theoretical 
approaches that attempt to explain nationalism. Theories of nationalism have 
tended to revolve around the issue of origins, principally through the long-
standing academic debate between so-called primordialist, ethno-symbolist 
and modernist scholars, which turns on the question of how we can date 
nations and explain how they came about. This controversy is only of indirect 
relevance here, as the present text is more concerned with how existing 
nation-states and nationalist movements respond to current challenges. 
Nonetheless, the question of origins does matter to how nationalists and 
nation-builders define their respective nations. The point at issue has been 
summed up as ‘do nations have navels?’ (Gellner 1996). In other words, were 
they born of some pre-existing entity, such as an ethnic group, or were they 
new creations brought about by a unique concatenation of events? Did they 
spring from the European industrial revolution of the late eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries (Gellner 1964, 1983), the exploitation of print 
technologies by dissatisfied, colonised intelligentsia (Anderson 1991), or the 
evolution of a form of ‘proto-nationalism’ from the medieval period onwards 
(Greenfeld 1993, Llobera 1994)? The first section of the chapter examines the 
(limited) usefulness of established theories of nationalism for explaining 
contemporary nationalism.  
 
The second section of the chapter goes on to look at some theoretical 
approaches to contemporary nationalism. So-called ‘neo-nationalisms’ 
(McCrone 1998) are shown to be adaptable in articulating the link between 
the individual and the collective in the pursuit of legitimacy. The discussion 
looks at how contemporary nationalisms are different to nineteenth century 
forms, in order better to understand their response to twenty-first century 
challenges. The chapter’s final section then turns to post-colonial theory, and 
its impact on nationalist ideology. By the nineteenth century, a large 
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proportion of the globe was under European imperial domination by the 
nineteenth century, with colonial powers only gradually withdrawing between 
the end of World War I and as late as 1980 for the likes of Zimbabwe (and 
1990 for Namibia, controlled by Germany and then South Africa). It is 
therefore important to investigate colonialism’s lasting impact on nationalism 
in successor states, not only in former colonies, but also former colonising 
powers. The evolution of post-war attitudes towards British citizenship and 
identity, for instance, had much to do with migrants arriving in the United 
Kingdom from the Commonwealth. The chapter concludes that contemporary 
nationalisms do indeed differ from older variants, and not least because of 
their need to respond to the cosmopolitan challenge. Nevertheless, nationalist 
ideologues continue to mobilise followers using appeals to primordial symbols 
or claims to represent an ancient nation, and demand recognition on that 
basis. This, in turn, can affect their relative openness to newcomers, or their 
protectiveness of traditions. The nation’s putative origins therefore continue to 
be relevant to contemporary nationalist ideology. 
 
I Theories of Nationalism 
 
One ongoing debate within nationalism theory divides ethno-symbolist and 
modernist scholars. It confronts the claim that nations are rooted in some 
ancient ethnie, symbolic or otherwise, with the contention that nations are a 
product of the last two centuries of modernisation (cf. Hutchinson & Smith 
1996, 40-56). Another key debate juxtaposes ethnic and civic variants of 
nationalism, and tends to depict them as irreconcilable opposites. In this 
instance, discussed further in chapters two and five, a form of nationalism 
based on exclusive criteria of belonging such as language, religion or blood is 
contrasted with a nation defined according to state citizenship. These two sets 
of perspectives, although having the merit of clarity, very much over-simplify 
possible approaches to explaining and classifying nationalisms. 
Consequently, the pairings are most usefully seen as labels denoting end 
points on a scale, rather than as strict dichotomies (Brown 1999, 300). Most 
scholars would not situate themselves at either pole of these discussions. For 
instance, in the celebrated debate entitled ‘Do nations have navels?’ which 
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pitted the ‘ethno-symbolist’ Anthony Smith against the ‘modernist’ Ernest 
Gellner, each made considerable concessions to the other’s position (Gellner 
1996, 90). 
 
This section briefly surveys some explanatory theories of nationalism in order 
to evaluate their relevance to contemporary nationalism and its responses to 
the cosmopolitan challenge. They are discussed at much greater length in 
Kellas (1991), Hutchinson (1994), Özkirimli (2000), Lawrence (2005), Ichijo 
and Uzelac (2005) and Delanty and Kumar (2006) among others. In 
attempting to account for the rise of nationalism, each theory emphasises 
different factors as crucial. Michael Mann, for instance, points to the 
importance of nationalism as a means of mobilising men to aliment the 
military machines of nineteenth-century states (1993). Benedict Anderson 
(1991) highlights the influence of what he calls ‘print capitalism’, understood 
as the ever-more rapid and wide dissemination of the printed word, in 
fostering a sense of shared national identity amongst the nineteenth-century 
bourgeoisie. Miroslav Hroch (1985) depicts intellectual elites as the force 
fuelling the growth of national consciousness, dividing the process of 
nationalist mobilisation into phases, in which first intellectuals, then the 
bourgeoisie and finally the masses throw their weight behind a political 
project.  
 
Ernest Gellner (1964, 1983, 1994), who ranks as one of the most influential 
modernist theorists, characterised nineteenth century European nationalism 
as a response to the dislocation brought on by the uneven development of 
industrialisation and urbanisation. He claimed that, by being uprooted from 
their homes and thrown together in unfamiliar urban surroundings, people 
were forced to reassess their loyalties in order to recreate a sense of 
belonging, and did so by identifying with national constructs. Nationalist 
ideology also had strong mobilising potential among those disappointed by 
the promise of social mobility and equality in the new urban centres. That is, a 
frustrated intelligentsia would strive to create its own national arena in which 
to exercise the power it had been denied under imperial or aristocratic rule. In 
turn, Gellner’s much-quoted aphorism, “every man is a clerk”, referred to a 
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concomitant spread of education in local languages, which helped to foster 
mass participation in these newly-configured nations (Gellner 1964, 159). The 
present text’s focus on nationalist ideology shares Gellner’s concern with elite 
constructions of the nation, rather than their mass dissemination and 
consumption. However, contemporary nationalism evolves in very different 
circumstances to the nineteenth century European context which Gellner 
described.  
 
Alongside that of John Armstrong (1982), Walker Connor (1994) and Josep 
Llobera (1994) among others, the work of Anthony D. Smith has a strong 
focus on ethnicity as a precursor and foundation of the nation. Smith, who 
describes his own approach as ‘ethno-symbolist’, asserts the existence of 
pre-modern ethnies and contends that modern states have been built around 
ethnic communities. He uses the term ethnie to mean “a named human 
population with myths of common ancestry, shared historical memories and 
one or more common elements of culture, including an association with a 
homeland, and some degree of solidarity, at least among elites” (Smith 1991, 
13). According to Smith, the development of a nation from an ethnie is 
equivalent to the transition from a passive community to an active, organised 
and assertive one; “We are not talking here about actual descent, much less 
about race, but about the senses of ancestry and identity that people 
possess” (Smith 1986, 150, emphasis in original). Walker Connor’s (1994, 75) 
definition of the nation as “a group of people characterized by a myth of 
common descent” supports Smith’s view. These scholars do not dispute that 
nationalists make selective readings of the past, but argue that the selection 
must take place within limits set by pre-existing myths, symbols, customs and 
memories (Smith 1986, 154).  
 
A.D. Smith (1981, 90) has sought to marry his ‘ethno-symbolist’ approach 
with a theory of ‘ethnic historicism’. This posits an elite in search of a political 
arena, which they set out to create through the historical derivation of an age-
old nation. Like Elie Kedourie and Ernest Gellner before him, Smith has 
emphasised the central role played by an ambitious and frustrated educated 
elite in fostering nationalist movements, linking the emergence of secular 
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intellectuals to a rejection of religion and the growing popularity of 
evolutionary theories of human development. Influenced by the rationalism of 
the Enlightenment, but rebelling against its universalising tendencies, these 
secular intellectuals found themselves in conflict with the Church and other 
traditional authorities, who feared for their own legitimacy. Asserting a 
nation’s ancient origins, in turn, was designed to burnish its credentials as an 
alternative source of legitimacy (Smith 1981, 102). According to Smith (1981, 
87), nationalist elites variously chose what he calls a neo-traditionalist, 
assimilationist or reformist route, but all uncovered “submerged ethnic ties 
and sentiments,” judged to be essential in shaping every nationalist 
movement. Simply put, ethnic historicism describes a search for identity, one 
founded on a remote point in time and a myth of common ancestry. 
 
Despite the sophistication of some of the theories outlined above, they are for 
the most part deterministic and universalistic, as they purport to find their 
favoured factors at the root of all nationalist movements. For example, Gellner 
(1983, 39) asserts that “a homogeneity imposed by objective, inescapable 
imperative eventually appears on the surface in the form of nationalism.” 
Although Gellner did divide nationalism’s different manifestations into 
geographical and historical zones, these categories describe very general 
processes and are of limited applicability to specific cases. For instance, he 
divided Europe into four historical time zones, describing the Atlantic 
seacoast zone, for one, as based on strong dynastic states (Gellner 1994). 
Critics of Gellner also accuse him of being both ahistorical and apolitical in 
underestimating the reach and influence of nationalism as a political doctrine 
(O’Leary 1996, 110). Similarly, Liah Greenfeld (1993) accuses Gellner of 
ignoring the historical contingency of many nationalist phenomena. Greenfeld 
herself, on the other hand, charts the rise of English nationalism, among 
others, before the advent of industrialisation, which Gellner takes as his 
starting point. Yet at the same time as acknowledging the huge variation in 
nationalist movements according to their situational constraints, Greenfeld 
also proposes a universal explanatory model of nationalism based on an 
identity crisis, or anomie, of the relevant social actors (Greenfeld 1993, 14-
17).  
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Like Gellner, Elie Kedourie (1966) is also a modernist. Contrary to Gellner, 
however, Kedourie concentrates on the history of nationalism as an idea. To 
this extent, he shares the present text’s focus on ideology. Kedourie offers a 
detailed account of the philosophical roots and development of nationalism, 
discussing its ideological links with left and right, liberalism, democracy and 
civil rights. He also discusses the social standing of nineteenth century 
European ideologues such as Johann Gottfried Herder and Giuseppe 
Mazzini, and throws light on the professional frustration, political inexperience 
and intellectual idealism motivating their writing. Kedourie’s argument is that 
such men initially shaped nationalist politics, but that later figures like Hitler, 
Stalin and Lenin were responsible for distorting and debasing sophisticated 
intellectual debate. Kedourie also tends to see nationalism’s chauvinistic, 
German and ethnic form as its archetype, leading him to conclude that 
“nationalism is unknown” (Kedourie 1966, 143) in the likes of Great Britain 
and the U.S. This analysis differs starkly from that of the present text, which 
considers both banal nation-building and ‘hot’ nationalism – as discussed in 
chapter two - to be variants of the same core ideological principle of 
prioritising the nation.  
 
Paul Brass (1991), like Kedourie, also emphasises nationalism’s ideological 
nature. Like A.D. Smith and Gellner too, he highlights the importance of elites 
in shaping and propagating nationalist ideas. Brass (1991, 13) argues that 
elite competition, rather than ethnic identity per se, constitutes the basic 
dynamic of ethnic conflict. He underlines the importance of the political and 
economic environment in shaping the expression of ethnic identity and its 
politicised form, nationalism, in line with notions of ‘invented tradition’ 
(Hobsbawm & Ranger 1983) as well as constructed social realities. Similarly, 
John Breuilly (1993) points to the central role of state authorities in 
manipulating nationalism to mobilise the population. This supports his thesis 
that nationalism is used to create an ideological link between the cultural and 
the political, or society and the state (whether actual or desired.) Breuilly puts 
state structures and their need for legitimation at the forefront of his approach 
to nationalism. Like the present text, he does not claim to explain nationalism, 
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stating that there “is no valid explanatory theory of nationalism, only a number 
of ways of describing and comparing various forms nationalist politics have 
taken” (Breuilly 1993, 338). According to Breuilly (1993, 343), nationalism is 
simply a product of “the need to make sense of complex social and political 
arrangements.” He also points to nationalism’s adaptability as an important 
element of its appeal, and highlights the construction of national stereotypes, 
histories and enemies as crucial to the success of a nationalist party. Here we 
encounter the flexibility of nationalist ideology, which is particularly relevant in 
the context of the cosmopolitan challenge. Kenneth Minogue’s (1967, 31) 
definition of the nation as “something to be found largely in the aspirations of 
nationalists” and his emphasis on “legend-making” is also similar to Brass and 
Breuilly’s view of nationalism as a political construct. One of Minogue’s central 
contentions about modern nationalism is that “the politics come first, and the 
national culture is constructed later” (Minogue 1967, 154). He thereby 
underlines both the power of national symbols to inspire political action and 
the fact that nationalism is an ideology largely empty of content, less akin “to a 
theory than to a rhetoric” (Minogue 1967, 153). M. K. Flynn (2000, 30) also 
contends that  “a precise ideological content, outside of a loyalty to the nation, 
for nationalism per se is impossible to establish.” These views recall Michael 
Freeden’s (1998) definition of nationalism as a ‘thin’ ideology, whose core 
principle of prioritising the nation needs be supplemented with elements from 
across the political spectrum. This is a useful insight, which helps to account 
for the wide variation in nationalist movements. It also suggests that elements 
of the cosmopolitan challenge can be integrated into nationalist thought.  
 
Paul Brass (1991) claims that symbols and myths are selected and 
manipulated instrumentally according to their political usefulness, concluding 
that “[t]he important goal for nationalist movements in this regard is 
exclusivity, the drive to become the sole political representative of the 
community” (Brass 1991, 49). Such a reading chimes well with this text’s 
focus on how the boundaries of the nation are being challenged by the 
cosmopolitan moment. Responding to Brass’s case study of Muslim 
nationalism in India, Francis Robinson takes issue with this stance, however, 
arguing that Islam had a far greater limiting effect on elites and the form of 
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political mobilisation they adopted than Brass admits. In his critique of Brass, 
Robinson (1994, 217) acknowledges that Brass does not dismiss the 
importance of primordial elements altogether. Nevertheless, he emphasises 
that the influence of primordial factors on nationalist movements should not be 
underestimated, as these shape not only “the range of legitimate actions for 
the elite […] but also form their own apprehensions of what was possible and 
of what they ought to be trying to achieve.” Breuilly and Brass do recognise 
that pre-existing factors influence elites to a certain extent. For instance, 
Breuilly (1993, 344) states that elites “begin with a fund of intellectual 
assumptions about what society is and how it is organised” (cf. Greenfeld 
1993, 15). This suggests that a balanced approach lies somewhere in 
between a primordialist and a constructivist theory. The debate between 
Brass and Robinson provides one illustration of the middle way that many 
scholars seek to navigate between the modernist and primordialist, or ethno-
symbolist poles, which marked the starting point of this discussion.  
 
More recent anthologies on the origins of nations revisit the debate between 
primordialists, modernists and ethno-symbolists, in an explicit attempt to move 
the discussion forward (Ichijo & Uzelac 2005). However, despite fine-grained 
attempts to splice questions of origins by distinguishing the sociological (when 
is a nation?) from the historical (when is the nation?), substantially different 
approaches persist (Ichijo & Uzelac 2005, 5). One advantage of focusing on 
nationalism as an ideology is that these disputes fade into the background; 
nations are primarily of interest here as a component of ideologies. For 
example, if nationalists make a strong case for the primordial origins of their 
nation, the present text is less concerned with the objective ‘truth’ or the 
historical accuracy of that claim, than with the role it plays in furthering their 
cause. Adopting this perspective also escapes what A.D. Smith identifies as 
the tautology of defining the nation in terms of European and North American 
modernity, thereby excluding other variants (Smith 2005, 95). Further, it 
appears that the relative modernity of nationalist ideology – as opposed to 
nations - is not at issue amongst theorists of nationalism; “Since there is a 
consensus that nationalism itself is a modern product, any study on 
nationalism should deal with the nature of modern society in which we live” 
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(Ichijo & Uzelac 2005, 3-4). Accordingly, the present text proposes to leave 
behind the fraught terrain of nations’ origins to focus instead on the 
construction of the nation in contemporary politics, and how nation-building is 
responding to the cosmopolitan challenge. The prolific and influential A.D. 
Smith also has something to say on this question. 
 
At the turn of the twenty-first century, A.D. Smith modified his long-standing 
definition of the nation to place less emphasis on the requirement of a mass 
public culture, a common economy and shared legal rights and duties. 
Instead, his more recent definition of the nation is “a named community 
possessing an historic territory, shared myths and memories, a common 
public culture and common laws and customs” (Smith 2002, 15). 
Nevertheless, this too has been criticised for conflating state characteristics, 
such as common laws, with those of the nation, whilst neglecting the political 
dimension of self-determination or statehood, which is so central to nationalist 
ideology. His silence on how “the state seeks to base its legitimacy on the 
idea that it represents the nation” (Guibernau 2004, 131) or how his definition 
of pre-modern nations translates to the contemporary era, has also been 
noted. As a result, many aspects of Smith’s work are of limited help in 
assessing the impact of the cosmopolitan challenge on contemporary nation-
building and sub-state nationalism.  
 
Smith’s definition of the nation appears to be a checklist of rather vague, 
objectifying criteria, despite his claims to the contrary (Smith 2004, 205). To 
consider the definition as only an ideal type - following Smith’s own advice -  
merely introduces further difficulties with classification, and still does not do 
justice to stateless nations without ‘common laws and customs’. Smith is right 
to point out the importance of antiquity in bolstering claims to the continuity 
and longevity of the nation. Analyses of contemporary nationalism, however, 
are most interested in how markers of cultural and historical belonging can 
function as components of nationalist ideology. Smith is also right to be 
cautious of those who dismiss today’s nationalisms as predominantly closed, 
backward, homogenising and violent (Smith 2004, 204). Instead, he regards 
so-called ‘nationalist globalisation’, understood as an “open, flexible 
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adaptation to the emerging global economy, but as a consciously national 
collectivity” (Smith 2004, 205), to be a more accurate way of approaching 
nationalism in the contemporary context. This view of nationalism and 
globalisation as potentially complementary forces offers a useful springboard 
for evaluating the impact of the cosmopolitan challenge on nationalist 
ideology. In the final analysis, however, the bulk of Smith’s work has been 
devoted to elucidating the ethnic origins of nations, and so his focus diverges 
substantially from that of this text.  
 
The deep-rooted nature of national loyalty and its strong mobilising potential 
led Josep Llobera (1994) to entitle his early book on nationalism ‘The God of 
Modernity.’ In distinguishing between phases of national consciousness, he 
demonstrates that the distance between the primordialist and modernist 
positions is not as great as might be expected; “Nationalism stricto sensu is a 
relatively recent phenomenon, but a rudimentary and restricted national 
identity existed already in the medieval period” (Llobera 1994, 220). 
Nevertheless, the extent to which a given ethnic heritage is real, imagined or 
invented still constitutes an important point of difference among theorists. 
Another key issue is determining whether intellectual elites, as the driving 
force behind a nationalist movement, are keepers or creators of the ethnic 
core. Their penchant for history is certainly not to be considered pointless 
nostalgia, but rather as a strategic reappraisal and reinterpretation of ethnic 
heritage for present purposes. It remains to be seen how this compares with 
forms of contemporary, or neo-nationalism. 
 
Evidently, neo-nationalisms go about mobilising people in quite a different 
environment to the nineteenth-century variants studied by the likes of Ernest 
Gellner and Benedict Anderson, who give contemporary nationalism short 
shrift (McCrone 1998, 125). Therefore, an alternative analytical framework is 
called for, one which incorporates the cosmopolitan challenge. This text does 
not seek to establish the antiquity or the authenticity of ethnic origins or 
national legitimating myths. Instead, it accepts Hobsbawm and Ranger’s 
(1983, 7) view of traditions as invented - whatever the source and pedigree of 
the components used - and focuses on the contemporary products of that 
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ideological process. Neither does this text try to explain ‘the rise of 
nationalism’ as a single phenomenon. Rather, it examines the impact of the 
cosmopolitan challenge on selected contemporary nationalisms, in all their 
variety and diversity. Nor does it seek to attribute objective characteristics to 
the nation or its antecedents. Instead, it analyses nations only as a product of 
the political ideology of nationalism. This accords with what Peter Alter (1985, 
16) calls the simplest definition of the nation, as a “politically-mobilised 
people.”  
 
Neo-nationalism 
Tom Nairn (1981) was among the first to distinguish between different eras of 
nationalism. He refers to ‘old nationalism’ as the process of nineteenth-
century European state-building, which took place in the context of industrial 
revolution and the breakdown of agrarian society. Nairn’s Marxian standpoint 
led him to link nationalist movements’ varying forms to the different stages of 
capitalist development in their respective nations. According to him, ‘new 
nationalism’ is a product of relative deprivation in an already modern, 
industrialised environment (Nairn 1981, 128). Nairn’s account of uneven 
development highlights the relevance of material circumstances to political 
mobilisation, whilst acknowledging the importance of symbols in cementing 
national solidarity. He also emphasises that each new manifestation of 
nationalism is sui generis - a product of unique circumstances - whilst 
retaining the core principles of nationalist ideology at its heart. This is another 
important insight informing the present analysis. Contemporary nationalism is 
faced with a very different set of circumstances to its nineteenth century 
counterparts. There is continuity in the fact that the nation is still “the idea 
which lies at the core of nationalism” (Greenfeld 1993, 4) and its enduring 
nature as a ‘thin’ ideology (Freeden 1998), but the definition of that nation has 
often evolved to meet the cosmopolitan challenge. Nairn points out that the 
context in which a nationalist movement develops helps to explain the way its 
ideology is structured. This section surveys several other scholarly 
approaches to contemporary nationalism before returning to Michael 
Freeden’s focus on nationalism as an ideology, as laid out in the introductory 
chapter of this text. 
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In his book ‘Nations against the State’, Michael Keating discusses the cases 
of Scotland, Catalonia and Quebec, three sub-state nations which enjoy 
substantial autonomy from the British, Spanish and Canadian governments 
respectively. Keating links sub-state political mobilisation there to the 
revolution in governance which has further undermined central state power in 
each case. However, Keating does not believe that the state is in general 
decline. Instead, he argues that it has been penetrated and destabilised by 
both supra-state and sub-state factors (Keating 2001, 28). His discussion of 
‘new nationalisms’ in these liberal democracies depicts them as generally 
civic movements which incorporate a broad social base and are progressive 
in their discourse. That is, they accept both the concept of limited sovereignty 
and the existence of multiple identities. For such movements to be 
successful, evidence of their competence in economic matters is also of 
utmost importance. Furthermore, he emphasises the role of nationalism in 
articulating a new political arena and thereby providing a focus for collective 
action. Given declining loyalty to the existing ‘nation-state’ construct in the 
cases he considers, sub-state territories are re-invented as an alternative 
focus of national identity. The way in which conflicts between the sub-state 
group and its state-level ‘Other’ are managed is therefore central to Keating’s 
analysis. It illustrates the effects of today’s political environment on the 
dynamics of sub-state movements, but is also helpful in considering 
nationalist ideologies and strategies more generally, supporting the case for a 
fresh approach to contemporary nationalism.  
 
Keating (2001, 28) recognises that nationalism is an ideology but does not 
explore the implications. Jenkins and Sofos (1996), on the other hand, focus 
on nationalism as a political, historically specific ideology whilst highlighting, 
like Keating, the importance of social negotiation in shaping the strategies 
and interests of collectivities. The nation emerges from their account as a 
conceptual tool manipulated by nationalist movements in order to legitimate 
their political project. David McCrone’s discussion of ‘neo-nationalism’, which 
generally tallies with Keating’s, also underlines its flexibility and context-
dependency. For instance, McCrone (1998, 129) asserts that in contemporary 
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nationalism “different ideological elements are mixed and mobilised: right/left; 
ethnic/civic; past/future; local/global; corporatist/neo-liberal; 
separatist/autonomist.” This portrayal suggests that nationalism must 
constantly develop and be ready to adapt its articulation of the link between 
the individual and the collective. To this extent, contemporary nationalism 
appears well equipped to respond to the cosmopolitan challenge. Montserrat 
Guibernau (1999) examines the relationship between sub-state nationalism 
and the changing global political order by focusing on three issues; the 
conceptual triad of state, nation and nationalism, the role of intellectuals in 
promoting nationalism, and the means nationalist movements use to achieve 
their aims. This corresponds to a concern with the legitimacy, agency and 
strategy of nationalist ideology. Much like Michael Freeden, whose work is 
considered further below, Guibernau points to the necessity of supplementing 
nationalism, as a ‘thin’ ideology, with principles from other ideologies. 
Although she does not elaborate on this theme, she considers that the 
“political ideologies to which nationalism is attached are crucial to 
understanding the significance and character of nationalism in each particular 
case” (Guibernau 1999, 7).  
 
States’ need for the legitimating function of nationalism has not been eroded 
by the cosmopolitan challenge. On the contrary, this challenge has only 
emphasised nationalism’s importance in maintaining the nation-state 
construct. In stark contrast to Delanty and Kumar’s (2006, 3) view that “the 
state disengages from the nation” as a result of transnationalism, the present 
text contends that nation-building is adapting to transnationalism and other 
aspects of the cosmopolitan challenge in order to retain state legitimacy. As 
Delanty and Kumar (2006, 3) correctly note, nationalism is indeed “embroiled 
in the public culture of the democratic state”, and it is important to add that 
appeals to national solidarity are also central to legitimating authoritarian 
regimes. Given this recognition of nationalism’s enduring influence, any talk 
of its retreat – particularly in an age when communism and fascism no longer 
threaten its dominant position – is perplexing. This may be attributed to 
competing categorisations, which distinguish nationalism as a well-defined 
ideology or social movement on the one hand, from its more diffuse presence 
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as an emotion, an identity or an element of public discourse on the other 
(Hearn 2006, 6).  
 
Siniša Malešević (2006, 89) divides ideology into what he calls its ‘normative’  
- or ideological - and ‘operative’ levels, which partly overlap with the 
characterisation of nationalism as an emotion, identity or discourse. What he 
aims to show through selected case studies is that the core ‘normative’ 
principles of ideologies like political Islam, socialism and liberal democracy 
tend to be expressed through nationalist rhetoric at the ‘operative’ level. For 
instance, he finds the same discourse of national pride, heroism and wartime 
sacrifice in speeches by British, Iranian and Yugoslav leaders, and in the 
history texts taught to schoolchildren in all three cases. Although Malešević’s 
analytical focus on ideology is refreshing, it does not equate to the 
interpretation adopted here. In Michael Freeden’s view (1998), discussed in 
the introduction to this text, Malešević’s case studies represent three ‘thick’ 
ideologies, which are supplemented and in some cases supplanted by 
nationalist rhetoric. By contrast, the present text looks at variants of ‘thin’ 
nationalist ideology and the peripheral principles and strategies supporting 
their core commitment to prioritising the nation, ranging from highly inclusive 
policies to terrorist activities. 
 
As one of a series of recent monographs reviewing nationalism theory 
debates in the light of globalisation  (Day & Thompson 2004; Özkirimli 2005; 
Hearn 2006), Spencer and Wollman’s (2002) contribution to the literature 
stands out for clearly aligning itself with those “contemporary theorists [who] 
find nationalism utterly unacceptable, in whatever shape it appears” (Vincent 
2002). Their critical stance is explicitly motivated by the wars in Yugoslavia. In 
their view, national identity is problematic in “that the cohesion it secures is 
essentially pre-political” (Spencer & Wollman 2002, 201). This assertion 
fundamentally conflicts with the present approach to nationalism as an 
inherently political ideology. Spencer and Wollman ultimately recommend 
more cosmopolitan forms of solidarity as a lesser evil than nationalism, since 
it “is not difficult to expose what is ideological about these” (Spencer & 
Wollman 2002, 197) if and when these provide a front for sinister, less than 
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altruistic agendas. Unfortunately, however, the authors do not look at 
nationalism in the same light. Taking issue with scholars who see a relatively 
progressive, inclusive form of nationalism in the likes of Scotland, Quebec 
and Catalonia (Keating 2001), Spencer and Wollman (2002, 179) contrast 
statements by leading nationalists with surveys and - in one rather bizarre 
example – comments by a nationalist leader’s wife, in order to show that 
nationalism must be inherently intolerant. They use opinion poll evidence to 
the effect that not all respondents supported an inclusive definition of 
nationalism, in order to assert that inclusive nationalism must be inherently 
unviable. This seems a rather shaky basis from which to conclude that 
nationalism equates with chauvinism, because it would also mean that no 
ideology could be deemed coherent unless a majority of people supported it. 
To take another example, their basically sound argument that democratic 
accountability should justify political devolution would have been more 
convincing had it not been set against the narrow assumption that all 
nationalism is essentially chauvinistic (Spencer & Wollman 2002, 181). In 
analysing nationalism, Spencer and Wollman’s prejudice against it clouds 
their reasoning. It is part of their refusal to see the same core principles at 
work in both banal and ‘hot’ nationalism, discussed in chapter two of this text. 
 
All of the authors surveyed agree that contemporary nationalism should be 
approached differently to its nineteenth-century counterparts, and that 
strategic flexibility in the face of changing state, sub-state and supra-state 
relationships is a key component of ‘neo-nationalism’. They also tend to 
recognise nationalism as an ideology without exploring the analytical 
implications. By contrast, the stated aim of David Brown’s Contemporary 
Nationalism is to “unravel nationalism by isolating and examining its 
ideological components” (Brown 2000, 152). He adopts what he calls a 
constructivist approach to nationalism, defining it as “an ideology offering a 
distorted perception of reality, containing selective simplifications and 
elements of myth” (Brown 2000, 1). He then goes on to distinguish civic, 
ethnocultural and multicultural nationalisms, arguing that the last has recently 
emerged from the ‘unravelling’ of the first two. However, Brown also highlights 
the inter-penetration of these three variants. This evocation of competing 
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constructions of the nation identifies key aspects of contemporary 
nationalism, which are explored throughout this text and specifically in 
chapter two.  
 
As we saw in the introduction, Michael Freeden’s account of ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ 
ideologies makes a clear distinction between core and peripheral ideological 
principles. According to Freeden, nationalism is a thin-centred ideology, as it 
has few core characteristics beyond prioritising the nation. He cites feminism 
and environmentalism as other examples of thin ideologies, since they have 
no inherent principles with which to implement their basic commitment to 
women’s rights and environmental protection respectively. These ideologies 
therefore require peripheral policies, such as opposition to nuclear fuel, 
demands for limits to toxic emissions, or measures to promote sexual 
equality, in order to translate their core goals into a practical strategy. 
Similarly, today’s nationalists must interpret their core goal of prioritising the 
nation in a way suited to their political environment. Self-determination, 
therefore, has no precise, immutable form within nationalist ideology, as every 
nationalist movement combines it with a different set of peripheral principles.  
 
Despite their shared commitment to self-determination, then, nationalist 
movements interpret this core goal in myriad ways. This proposition helps us 
understand the wide variations in contemporary nationalist ideology and 
strategy. The core of a thin-centred ideology like nationalism must be 
supplemented with elements from other ideologies. Conversely, a thin-
centred ideology like nationalism can be used to supplement an otherwise 
‘thick’ ideology lacking in one fundamental area. For example, most 
governments implicitly accept the nation-state’s existing boundaries and use 
them as the basis for nation-building. Despite being conservative, liberal or 
socialist first and foremost, governments thereby incorporate a basic element 
of nationalism into their ‘thick’ ideologies (Freeden 1998). According to 
Freeden, core principles are the bare bones of a belief-system, which require 
fleshing out. A combination of nationalism and cosmopolitanism is therefore 
thinkable within this conceptual framework.  
 
Freeden describes nationalism as a thin-centred ideology with five core 
principles; first, the prioritisation of the nation as a key defining framework for 
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human beings; second, the positive valorisation of the nation; third, the desire 
to give a political and institutional form to the nation; fourth, the importance of 
space and time in determining social identity and fifth, a sense of belonging 
closely bound up with emotion (Freeden 1998, 751-2). The first of these 
elements sums up nationalism’s core commitment to self-determination. 
However, as Montserrat Guibernau (1996, 63) rightly points out, nationalist 
ideology “does not indicate the direction to be taken or the methods which 
should be adopted to achieve [this goal].” Hence the ‘chameleon-like’ nature 
of nationalism, a flexible ideology par excellence, capable of being moulded 
to fit every situation. For instance, fascist ideology has sought to prioritise the 
nation by ‘purifying’ it of foreign elements. To take a very different example, 
anti-colonial nationalism has sometimes been combined with communist 
principles, or has simply sought to create national solidarity on the basis of 
opposition to the colonial oppressor. Finally, a relatively inclusive form of 
nationalism is also thinkable, which makes its appeals on the basis of shared 
and easily attainable citizenship. These examples show how some of 
nationalism’s many variants can be incorporated into Freeden’s typology of 
‘thick’ and ‘thin’ ideologies. As such, this conceptual framework “accounts for 
the flexibility of nationalist ideologies in application and development” (Flynn 
2000, 14). 
 
Freeden’s distinction between thick and thin ideologies goes beyond 
recognising the wide variation in contemporary nationalisms; it also provides a 
framework for examining their similarities. All forms of contemporary 
nationalism, including nation-building, share the same core principle of 
national self-determination. In addition, nation-building also seeks to 
legitimate the state by equating state and nation (Sutherland 2010, 5). To 
indicate one’s nationality as Italian, Nigerian, Brazilian, Australian or 
Japanese is to evoke a national construct. This is because every nationalist 
variant, whether terrorist, democratic or ‘banal’ (Billig 1995), pursues the 
political goal of embodying its interpretation of the nation through territory, 
institutions and in some cases, the national diaspora (Barabantseva & 
Sutherland 2011). Michael Freeden has shown that the differences between 
these examples are a result of variations in peripheral principle and strategy, 
but that the focal point of national mobilisation remains the same. A world of 
‘nation-states’, then, expresses the all-pervasiveness of ‘thin’ nationalism. 
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Similarly, A. D. Smith has proposed his own analysis of the ‘core doctrine’ of 
nationalism. Two of its basic propositions are the division of the world into 
nations, on the one hand, and the nation as the source of all political and 
social power on the other (Smith 1991, 74). 
 
Many aspects of our daily lives are constructed around a concept of the nation 
which is taken for granted. People everywhere are exposed to this kind of 
‘banal nationalism’ (Billig 1995), which will be examined in more detail in 
chapter two. The more entrenched the nation-building discourse of a given 
state, the harder it is to impose an alternative interpretation of the nation. 
However, to describe ‘thin’ nationalism as all-pervasive does not lead to the 
analytical redundancy of the concept. On the contrary, it permits a clearer and 
more dispassionate categorisation of its possible variants. There is an 
unjustified tendency to neglect the concept of ideology in studying 
contemporary nationalism, when ideology can structure the analysis by 
attending to both flexible and immutable principles. In other words, the 
strategic element in the definition of ideology allows scope for analysing 
nationalism’s flexibility and pragmatism in responding to the cosmopolitan 
challenge, whereas its conceptual core provides a touchstone for identifying 
and categorising very different cases of nationalism. This approach comes 
into its own when studying post-colonial nationalism.  
  
Post-Colonial Nationalism 
Inevitably, imperialism shaped anti-colonial nationalism, which often used the 
language and concepts of its European oppressors in order to organise 
resistance (Chatterjee 1993). Schooled in the ways of their ‘masters’, anti-
colonial intellectuals demanded that principles like liberty, equality, fraternity, 
democracy and self-determination be extended to them. On achieving 
independence, the preservation of national sovereignty remained paramount 
to decolonised countries. Indeed, the prospect of regionalisation and 
globalisation still makes some states nervous about losing autonomy only 
recently wrested from colonialists. Most Southeast Asian states, for instance, 
are unwilling to cede sovereignty to their regional grouping, the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (Sutherland 2009; Narine 2004). Alongside 
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imperialism’s legacy in post-colonial states, it has also had a lasting impact on 
nation-building in former imperial powers. Decolonisation after World War II 
entailed the reorganisation of much of Africa and Asia - but also Europe - into 
nation-states, as former empires like the United Kingdom and France 
contemplated their loss of global influence (Wilder 2005; Berger 2003, 422).  
 
Benedict Anderson (1991) has proved extremely influential in theorising anti-
colonial nationalism, as has his use of concepts like ‘print capitalism’ and 
‘homogeneous empty time’ to help explain its development. His account of 
‘Creole pioneers’ in the Americas charts the growth of nationalist sentiment 
amongst the wealthy, landowning classes at the turn of the nineteenth 
century, before the growth of comparable European movements and, at first, 
independently of ‘print capitalism’ (Anderson 1991, 47). This does not 
correspond to the frustrated intelligentsia Ernest Gellner credits with 
establishing European nationalism. Rather, these Creole elites were frustrated 
in another way, namely by their inability to achieve power and status within 
the bureaucratic hierarchies of the colonial state, which were largely reserved 
for those born on the Iberian peninsula. According to Anderson, solidarity 
grew among those sharing the “fatality of trans-Atlantic birth” (Anderson 1991, 
57). This gradually extended to as yet illiterate, non-Creole natives, and would 
be consolidated into the nineteenth century with the rapid spread of ‘print 
capitalism’ across the Americas.  
 
Print capitalism is a key concept in Anderson’s work. It refers to the explosion 
in newspaper circulation and novels made possible by printing technology, 
the move away from Latin texts to publishing in a range of vernaculars, and 
the capitalist production process itself. Taken together, these elements 
provided the basis for imagining a community of fellow readers, whose 
dialects might make “it difficult or even impossible to understand one another 
in conversation [but who] became capable of comprehending one another via 
print and paper” (Anderson 1991, 44). For instance, David Marr (1971, 1981) 
charts the exponential rise in book and newspaper publishing in early 
twentieth century Vietnam, then a part of French Indochina. The use of a 
relatively accessible romanised script known as quoc ngu - meaning national 
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language – and the prominence of nationalist themes, were designed to 
encourage the spread of the national imaginary as part of the anti-colonial 
struggle. According to Anderson, and with specific reference to Southeast 
Asia, twentieth century movements also arose - particularly amongst 
indigenous functionaries and the native intelligentsia - from a comparable 
sense of frustration to that felt by earlier Creole pioneers in the Americas 
(Anderson 1991, 126). In the case of these low-level bureaucrats, or clerks, it 
was the limited educational and employment opportunities afforded by the 
colonial system which made them hungry for more, and for the freedom to 
fulfill their potential. According to Anderson (1991, 116), their nationalism 
came from exposure to European education, and formed the basis of an anti-
colonial solidarity, which often rested on ambivalent, colonially-influenced 
territorial foundations. For instance, the Vietnamese Communist Party, as the 
leading group in the Vietnamese League for Independence (Viet Minh), was 
originally called the Indochinese Communist Party and remained undecided 
as to the limits of the Vietnamese nation right up until the 1940s (Goscha 
1995). 
 
Although Anderson’s work is generally recognised as path-breaking in looking 
beyond Europe for the origins of nationalism, he has been criticised for 
applying concepts like print capitalism too readily across the globe, resulting 
in the neglect of marginal groups and anti-colonial particularities, including the 
way in which local intelligentsia adapted European models to their own 
context (Kelly & Kaplan 2001). Anderson does tend to focus on the urban, 
reading public and pass over certain sections of the population in his broad 
analytical sweep. For instance, he quotes the opening of a novel by the 
Filipino nationalist José Rizal to illustrate its appeal to a nationalist audience 
(Anderson 1991, 27). However, he ignores those not invited to the glittering 
Manilan party evoked in Rizal’s book, such as the marginalised minorities 
living in the hinterlands (Rosaldo 2003, 6). This raises the issue of agency; 
was anti-colonial nationalism merely an elite, ideological undertaking and if 
so, how did it become an instrument of mass mobilisation? How did ‘the 
people’ interpret and internalise a sense of national belonging? This is one 
area investigated by so-called ‘subaltern scholars’, who are concerned with 
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those rarely given a voice in official histories.  
 
The subaltern has been defined in the Indian context as “the demographic 
difference between the total Indian population and all those we have defined 
as elite” (Guha, cited in Loomba 1998, 199). Rather than pit coloniser against 
native, then, this approach introduces a different distinction to help 
understand the postcolonial legacy. On the one hand, it groups the 
indigenous entrepreneurs, the bourgeoisie and the bureaucrats at all levels of 
seniority who adopted an ‘all-India’ perspective. On the other, it places those 
like the lowest-caste Hindu Dalits, who did not feel represented by India’s 
postcolonial nationalist discourse. Although there is a danger of merely 
replacing one simplistic dichotomy with another by essentialising these 
groups, such as approach does alert us to the enduring influence of “the 
state’s practice of co-opting the ruling strata of native society and reshaping 
their traditional authority” (Cheah 2003, 284). This can be observed in both 
colonised and postcolonial countries. However, even within relatively 
centralised postcolonial states, these co-opting strategies have varied 
according to regional particularities (Boone 2003). In post-war Senegal, for 
instance, the nationalist leader Léopold Senghor sought to accommodate 
regional elites in order to gain their support and, by extension, that of the local 
population. Ironically, anti-colonial nationalists might label themselves 
progressive and democratic – as Senghor’s parties did – whilst relying on a 
“fusion of elites” (Boone 2003, 60) composed of entrenched aristocratic 
families and local Islamic marabouts, who always seemed to find a privileged 
place within the evolving hierarchies of pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial 
rule. 
 
The cultural and postcolonial theorist Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak warns that 
the subaltern voice cannot be captured or recorded as a coherent whole, like 
some sort of authentic ethnic experience (Leonard 2005, 106). This approach 
has close affinities with poststructuralist theories, which highlight the 
inconsistencies and fissures in discourse that prevent any actual closure or 
completeness (Laclau & Mouffe 1985). Poststructuralism has been criticised, 
perhaps unfairly, for failing to move beyond this key proposition to develop a 
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critical response to colonialism, globalisation, transnationalism and 
revolutionary nationalism (Leonard 2005, 2). By contrast, such concerns are 
central to postcolonial theory, which extends to investigations of enduring 
colonial structures and legacies, and their contribution to current global 
inequalities that might be considered ‘neo-colonial.’ As such, postcolonial 
theory promises insights which are highly relevant to contemporary 
nationalism and the cosmopolitan challenge.  
 
Spivak (2008, 6) argues that any search for the essence of the subaltern 
subject will be in vain, but instead sees critical potential in recognising both 
the coloniser and colonised as heterogeneous and mutually constitutive. For 
example, dominant modes of thought are often shaped by paradigms 
emanating from Western academia, so that postcolonial scholars themselves 
may be unwittingly perpetuating imperial ideas (Leonard 2005, 108). This 
leads us to the notion of hybridity, which suggests an interdependence rather 
than a dichotomy, or strict opposition, between coloniser and colonised. Often 
associated with the theorist Homi Bhabha (1990a; 1990b), the concept of 
hybridity is useful in understanding how nations are shaped through 
relationships, rather than representing any essential characteristics. For 
instance, the coloniser’s sense of superiority can only exist in relation to the 
inferiority imputed to the colonised ‘Other’. Similarly, the bond of national 
belonging often derives from a shared, negative rejection of the outsider, 
rather than a positive and independent celebration of oneness. According to 
Bhabha (1990a, 296), however, even this source of solidarity has been 
ambivalent amongst colonisers. The conflicting characteristics they have 
attributed to the ‘native’ – innocent yet threatening, savage yet servile, 
primitive yet calculating – mean that we cannot begin to paint a clear picture 
of either the colonised or their colonisers (Leonard 2005, 128). In sum, we 
should not seek to essentialise postcolonial communities or generalise about 
any shared characteristics.  
 
Bhabha shows that the identities which colonisers themselves construct and 
propagate are necessarily unstable, thereby providing an opportunity for the 
oppressed and disempowered to undermine and resist those identities which 
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paint them as inferior. The concept of hybridity thus breaks down the division 
between ‘them’ and ‘us’ by pointing to the relativity of national, racial and 
ethnic categories, leaving the way open for the possibility of transnational 
alternatives in the contemporary arena (Bhabha 1990b; Leonard 2005, 134). 
Again, this suggests that some form of cosmopolitan nationalism is thinkable. 
Nevertheless, Bhabha and Comaroff also points to a conservative backlash 
against this trend;  
Current ‘origins’ of nationalism and fundamentalism have everything to do 
with an anxiety provoked by the complex process of cultural hybridization that 
challenges atavistic definitions. Such hybridization is as much part of the 
national scene as it is a global phenomenon [but] there is also the pressure to 
create a kind of coercive, lethal closure” (Bhabha & Comaroff 2002, 27).  
 
This highlights the problems inherent in denying the nation’s unfixity and 
ambivalence, and aiming for closure by positing an ancient, homogenous 
nation and unquestioningly anticipating its future progress and preservation as 
a unitary whole. Ironically, however, Bhabha’s critics point out that he 
presents hybridity as a universal phenomenon, thereby adopting precisely the 
universalising tendencies which he seeks to question (Leonard 2005; Cheah 
2003). The all-pervasiveness of nationalism also makes it a universal 
organising principle because it purports to associate every human being with 
a nation. Indeed, “the putative antithesis between cosmopolitan universalism 
and nationalist particularism misleadingly obscures the fact that both 
philosophical nationalism and cosmopolitanism articulate universal 
institutional models” (Cheah 2003, 2). Nationalism’s all-pervasiveness has 
also been expressed through Benedict Anderson’s conception of 
‘homogeneous, empty time’. Understood as people’s ability to imagine the 
“steady, anonymous, simultaneous activity” (Anderson 1991, 26) of their 
compatriots, and members of other nations beyond their own, this provides 
the basis for appeals to members of the nation as an “imagined community.” 
According to Anderson, it is also at the root of organic metaphors depicting 
the nation’s progress towards the future as a bounded, interconnected whole.  
 
Asserting the universality of nationalism’s foundations risks denying nation-
builders and nationalist movements any originality or independence in the way 
they imagine the national community. In response, Partha Chatterjee, both an 
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admirer and a critic of Anderson’s work, has sought to trace anti-colonial 
nationalism’s subtle blend of borrowing and differentiation through the case of 
Bengal. Chatterjee (1996, 217) describes a unique and spiritual cultural 
nationalism which “creates its own domain of sovereignty within colonial 
society well before it begins its political battle with the imperial power.” 
According to Chatterjee, this cultural domain embodied the originality of Indian 
nationalism. It was a key site of resistance outside of the state apparatus and 
independent of the more derivative political nationalism, which both had 
pervasive colonial associations. Thus, anti-colonial nationalism did not merely 
extend a Western ideology into new lands, but adapted it. Importantly, this 
created a realm outwith the reach of the state in which to develop non-
Western conceptions of literature, the family, gender roles and other aspects 
of society “that would be modern and at the same time recognizably Indian” 
(Chatterjee 1996, 220).  
 
A further interesting perspective on colonialism and nationalism comes from 
Shalini Puri (2004), who points out that Caribbean nationalists could never 
draw on a purist, primordial sense of nationhood. This leads her to question 
why hybridity and nation-building should ever be considered mutually 
exclusive in the first place. Instead, Puri explores so-called ‘hybrid 
nationalisms’, focusing on transnationalism as a way of “studying aspects of 
human experience and societies which cannot be contained within the nation-
state” (Puri 2004, 6). She rejects post-nationalism, however, which purports to 
transcend the nation-state altogether. According to Puri, focusing on 
transnational flows, from migrant labour to “five-star tourists” (Puri 2004, 24), 
may be one way of imagining the nation anew. Although she does not 
consider nationalism as an ideology, preferring its Andersonian gloss as a 
framework for political activity and emotional attachment (Anderson 1991, 5), 
Puri’s critique of the post-nationalist position is highly relevant to the present 
text. It draws our attention to the wide variety of more or less empowering 
hybrid identities, and more or less oppressive nationalisms. Though we 
should be wary of essentialising the nation, it may yet be imaginable in a more 
inclusive form, one more clearly attuned to transnationalism, diaspora and 
other aspects of the cosmopolitan challenge. One possible approach, which is 
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formulated explicitly in terms of the nation, contrasts territorially and 
monolingually defined nations “imposed by subordinating regions and 
ethnicities within more or less arbitrarily delimited spaces” with new forms of 
transterritorial and multilingual nations linked to the logics of markets and 
globalisation (García Canclini 1995, 29). This suggests that focusing on the 
marginalisation of minorities, such as is championed by subaltern scholars, 
need not entail jettisoning the nation-state construct in its entirety. Indeed, 
demonstrating an awareness of the enduring influence of the nation-state in 
dispensing privilege and status, and the diverse ways in which national 
borders are crossed, are useful starting points for conceptualising the 
heterogeneous, hybrid nationalisms that can arise as a result of the 
cosmopolitan challenge. 
 
Both Shalini Puri and Partha Chatterjee are concerned by the universalism 
implied in associating nationalism with a shared experience of (Western) 
capitalist modernity, privileging Enlightenment values of rationality, secularism 
and a belief in science and the state. For instance, Anderson’s (1991, 26) 
understanding of ‘homogeneous, empty time’ is premised on the decline of 
pre-modern perspectives, so that alternative interpretations of time and place 
tend to be dismissed as remnants of a bygone age. However, Chatterjee 
(2005) points out that people today draw on many heterogeneous ways of 
constructing and experiencing the nation, which cannot be dismissed as 
atavistic or invalid simply because they do not fit the Enlightenment mould. He 
also cautions against Anderson’s rather utopian depiction of the nation as 
promoting horizontal bonds of solidarity, when nation-building often goes hand 
in hand with enduring inequality. For instance, the formal, legal equality of 
Dalits (once termed Untouchables) as Indian citizens exists alongside 
continued caste discrimination, decades after India’s independence 
(Chatterjee 2005, 939).  
 
Similarly to Chatterjee, John Kelly (1998, 844) criticises Anderson’s view of 
nations as “symmetrical units of imagined, communal self-love”, because this 
suggests a horizontal leveling of individuals through notions of national 
solidarity and comradeship, which is belied by the hierarchies that pervaded 
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colonial rule and often persisted thereafter. Such a view can also detract 
attention from the upheaval of diasporic movements, and cases in which 
diasporas are denied a role in nation-building. For example, Kelly cites the 
case of Indo-Fijians, which is discussed further in chapter four. Brought by 
British colonialists to the Pacific Islands as indentured labourers in the 
nineteenth century, their descendants still remain subordinate to the principle 
of ethnic Fijian paramountcy. Kelly also charges Anderson with 
anachronistically projecting back into history a picture of a world divided into 
nations  - arguing that this organising principle can really only be traced to the 
creation of the United Nations following World War II - and should not stand in 
the way of seeking a “clearer understanding of the asymmetries in global 
flows” (Kelly 1998, 869). According to Kelly, the neatly delineated nation-
states we see represented on political maps or embodied around negotiating 
tables do not correspond to people’s lived experience. They are part of “an 
international normative order […] based on sovereign nation-states” (Delanty 
2006, 363), but as Chatterjee (2005, 928) puts it, this “is not located anywhere 
in real space–it is utopian.”  
 
Although this text is chiefly concerned with nationalism as a political ideology, 
and the way in which nationalists mobilise cultural symbols, it must also be 
alive to how these symbols shape and are shaped by people’s way of life, and 
this is discussed further in chapter two. Postcolonial theory is but one strand 
of a multifaceted approach to cultural nationalism, which looks beyond the 
“one-sided transmission of ideology from above [towards] an on-going 
consumption (and therefore reproduction) of culture in which various sections 
of the population participate” (Yoshino 1999, 2). These questions continue to 
be particularly relevant in postcolonial societies, which are confronted both 
with the legacy of the Western ‘Other’ and the impact of globalisation. The 
postcolonial legacy includes the cultural continuity, or ‘path dependency’, of 
colonial relationships, which still colour international relations, trading regimes 
and development flows to this day (Bebbington & Kothari 2006, 852). One 
example is France’s cultural and military engagement in many of its former 
African colonies, which are also members of the language alliance known as 
Francophonie. Similarly, the Commonwealth brings together many former 
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British colonies, and Portugal played an important part in the international 
intervention leading up to the independence of its former colony of East Timor 
from Indonesia in 2002 (Burke & McDonald 2007, 13). 
 
In the British context, the “unfinished contestations” (Clifford 1997, 3) of 
decolonisation can be observed in the way former colonial officials in Africa, 
India and elsewhere were redeployed in UK government development 
agencies. Not only did this degree of continuity affect nation-building in post-
independence states, but as Uma Kothari (2006) has shown, it also helped 
perpetuate a rather stereotypical view of the United Kingdom (particularly 
England) amongst its expatriates. An “imagined geography” of England “was 
sustained and reproduced as it circulated within colonial networks” 
(Bebbington & Kothari 2006, 857), upheld through ritual and reverence. This 
was a deterritorialised depiction of the nation, which existed outside the ‘home 
turf’ in the imaginations of these expatriate citizens, illustrating how the 
postcolonial legacy has resonance for former colonising countries as well as 
those colonised. In the words of one expatriate; “they weren’t living their 
nationalism; it was all in the head, it was a myth” (cited in Kothari 2006, 245). 
It could well be argued that the nation is no less mythical at home than away, 
especially if we understand a myth as “an abbreviated world outlook, an 
ideology in miniature” (Nothnagle 1993, 6). The notion of expatriates ‘living 
their nationalism’ highlights the strong assumption that the nation is realised 
through a close bond with and, ideally, proximity to the homeland. Yet as will 
be shown, transnationalism and the cosmopolitan challenge more generally 
are undermining that assumption (Barabantseva & Sutherland 2011). 
 
There is a long-standing tendency in the media and political discourse for the 
outsider, the immigrant, or the foreigner to be constructed as somehow 
threatening, thereby encouraging members of a national community to close 
ranks in order to preserve jobs, traditions, or some vague notion of national 
heritage (Stratton & Ang 1994). To use Edward Saïd’s terminology, this is a 
product of ‘imaginative geographies’, which create difference through distance 
(Gregory 2004, 17). The post-colonial moment, on the other hand, disrupts 
the neat dichotomy between ‘us’ and ‘them’ by excavating the colonial past in 
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order to uncover its continuing influence over the present (Gregory 2004, 7). 
The cultural theorist Stuart Hall (1997, 24) expresses this vividly with 
reference to his own emigration from Jamaica to England; “There is a 
tremendous paradox here which I cannot help relishing myself; that in the very 
moment when Britain finally convinced itself it had to decolonise, it had to get 
rid of them, we all came back home. As they hauled down the flag, we got on 
the banana boat and sailed right into London.”  
 
 
The situation faced by those nation-states which successively gained 
independence in the post-war era prefigured the cosmopolitan challenge. 
Their self-determination was internationalised from the outset, influenced by 
enduring economic ties with the former imperial power, bureaucratic legacies, 
cultural accretions and often a privileged path for emigration. Catapulted into 
a globalising world where transnational exchanges and localised adaptation 
were intensifying as never before, governments still had to meet the challenge 
of nation-building; “Postcolonies, even where they did constitute more or less 
integrated nation-states, could seldom achieve the autonomy promised by 
nationalist ideology precisely because they confronted global capitalist 
markets and unequal terms of trade” (Calhoun 2007, 18). Amidst a confusion 
of intermingling cultures, they had to construct a sense of national unity and 
solidarity. In so doing, nation-builders used nationalist symbolism to squeeze 
ethnic, cultural and religious diversity into a common crucible of national 
belonging. Whether privileging the “dominant ethnie” (Smith 1995, 106), as in 
Vietnam or Thailand, or espousing an official multiculturalism, as in Malaysia 
or Singapore, ethnic categories often originating in colonial times were 
imposed to help govern a clearly delimited people and pursue nation-state 
legitimacy within defined territorial borders (Anderson 1991, 168). But the 
difficulties of nation-building have not abated in the contemporary era, quite to 
the contrary. Indeed, “the difficulty of creating national cultures that might 
preserve, indeed nourish internal differences has emerged as a major issue in 
our time” (Loomba 1998, 203). 
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The preceding discussion of anti-colonial and postcolonial nationalism has 
questioned the view of nationalism as a Western export to the colonies. 
However, as Gayatri Spivak (2008, 1) has pointed out, we should also be 
wary of trying to capture the subaltern voice as somehow unsullied by the 
colonial associations of certain indigenous elites. Rather, we should take note 
of these colonial associations, their lasting effects on postcolonial nation-
building and, by extension, their influence on sub-state ethnic and nationalist 
movements. This applies both to postcolonial states and former colonising 
countries, whose own national identities continue to be influenced by 
decolonisation. Most obviously, their approach to citizenship and nation-
building has been strongly affected by migration and diaspora from former 
colonies. Finally, students and scholars of nationalism would do well to 
remind themselves that as citizens of any given nation-state, and perhaps 
also as patriots, migrants, members of a diaspora or sympathisers with sub-
state movements, they are also subjected to nationalist ideology. 
 
Conclusion 
Analysing nations as ‘imaginative geographies’ or ‘imagined communities’ 
acknowledges the creative licence inherent in every nationalist ideology. In 
turn, placing contemporary nationalism and nation-building in the context of 
the cosmopolitan challenge points to the transnational flows which complicate 
neatly delineated accounts of national territory, history and heritage. Just as 
young children learn to categorise objects differently according to the rules of 
their respective mother tongue, so the “encapsulated” (Lieberman 2003, 6) 
study of, say, French history or Uruguayan geography serves to consolidate 
these countries’ borders. This is a form of educational nationalism to rival the 
methodological nationalism discussed in the introduction to this text (Beck & 
Sznaider 2010 [2006]). Alternatively, and as Martha Nussbaum (1996) has 
argued, a curriculum covering cross-border trade, transnational culture and 
multinational corporations might prompt children to understand the 
organisation of space rather differently. At an analytical level, at least, we 
need to “step away from an ethnographic focus on separate, integral cultures 
[…] to focus on hybrid, cosmopolitan experiences as much as on rooted 
native ones” (Clifford 1997, 24). Postcolonial theory also teaches us to be 
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wary of the dominant nation-building narrative and interrogate what it leaves 
unsaid, or who is being silenced.  
 
Even though political enquiry such as that undertaken here may privilege the 
analysis of governments, movements, ideologies and global trends, nation-
building is not merely a top-down process. Approaching nationalism as an 
ideology still leaves enormous scope to study its many facets, from particular, 
individual interpretations (Cohen 1996), through its institutional 
manifestations, to party political pronouncements. Analysing nationalism as 
an ideology also helps to show how the nation is constructed and perpetuated 
through political discourse, international relations and everyday interaction 
(Billig 1995). In so doing, it becomes clear that linear accounts of national 
history are skewed, and that seemingly fixed borders of belonging are 
constructed. The nation is not ‘natural’, nor does the nation-state represent 
the inevitable organising principle of political life. Instead, it is the product of 
constant ideological work to create and maintain what remains a remarkably 
potent mobilising force. Nationalism’s resilience in the face of the 
cosmopolitan challenge is a result of its flexibility and adaptability, as 
subsequent chapters will show.  
 
This chapter has argued that theories relating to the emergence of nineteenth 
century nationalism are of limited use in exploring contemporary responses to 
the cosmopolitan challenge. Whilst Benedict Anderson’s concepts of print 
capitalism and homogenous empty time have been enormously influential in 
framing studies of nationalism within the colonial context, they tend to 
overlook marginalisation and difference, which are some of the very issues 
pushed to the fore by transnationalism, migration, diaspora, regionalisation 
and globalisation. Yet the universalising assumptions underlying much 
‘classical’ nationalism theory continue to influence assessments of 
contemporary nationalism. Alternatively, more recent examinations of 
contemporary nationalism tend to focus on specific case studies. These 
pragmatic, empirically-founded approaches offer useful insights into the 
recent evolution of contemporary nationalisms in response to the 
cosmopolitan challenge, by addressing the “difficult interplay between their 
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local and global contexts” (Loomba 1998, 257). Similarly, the following 
chapters use a series of case studies to illustrate some of the range of 
nationalist responses to aspects of the cosmopolitan challenge.  
 
